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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE JUDICIAL
ROLE IN INTRA-CHURCH DISPUTES IN WEST
VIRGINIA
From 1842 to 1969, the Avery United Methodist Church was
a local congregation within the United Methodist Church' or one
of its predecessor organizations. Over the years the congregation
occupied a subordinate position within the U.M.C.-it held itself
out to the community as a Methodist church, accepted ministerial
appointments made by the general church, and paid dues and
assessments to the general church. In 1968, the Avery congregation
reaffirmed this position by accepting the written law of the
U.M.C.-The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church.
The relationship between the U.M.C. and the Avery congrega-
tion came to an abrupt end in February, 1969. Because of dissatis-
faction with the theology and government of the general church,
the Avery congregation voted unanimously to withdraw from the
U.M.C. The newly independent church, known as Avery Chapel,
continued to occupy, use, and claim ownership of all of the local
church property.2 Its claim to ownership was based on the fact that
the property had been acquired solely by gifts and contributions
from local church members and their predecessors without any
assistance from the general church.
In support of its claim, the general church relied on the written
ecclesiastical law of the U.M.C.-The Book of Discipline-which
provides that the title to all property of a local church shall be held
in trust for the U.M.C. The U.M.C. brought suit in the Circuit
Court of Monongalia County to prevent the Avery church congre-
gation from retaining its property after the separation. The court
'Hereinafter referred to as U.M.C.
'This property included real estate acquired by four separate conveyances. The
deeds were executed and recorded according to W. VA. CODS § 35-1-1 to 13 (1931).
In all four deeds, the property was conveyed to named trustees of the church and
their successors in office. One deed included additional language imposing limita-
tions and conditions on the use of the property:
This conveyance is made to the aforesaid Trustees ... in trust, that
said premises shall be used, kept and maintained as a place of divine
worship or residence of the Methodist ministery [sic] and members of
the Methodist Church; subject to the disciplinary usage and ministerial
appointments of said church as from time to time is authorized and
declared by the General Conference and the Annual Conference within
whose bounds the said premises are situated.
Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d. 812, 822 (W. Va. 1973).
1
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applied church law and ruled in favor of the general church and
the trustee of the Avery congregation appealed. Held, affirmed. In
the absence of an express trust to the contrary, the beneficial own-
ership of church property is controlled by the usages, customs,
discipline, and ecclesiastical law of the general church. Brady v.
Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1973).
The Brady decision appears to work a substantial hardship on
the small congregation of Avery Chapel. Its members and their
ancestors contributed their time, labor, and property to the acquis-
ition and improvement of this community church. Yet the general
church, which had never aided the Avery congregation financially,
was allowed to appropriate all the property to its own use. The
individual members probably did not anticipate that their mem-
bership in the U.M.C. gave the general church such control. It is
equally improbable that the lay members had a thorough under-
standing of the intricacies of the ecclesiastical law on which the
general church predicated its authority. Nevertheless, the law of
the general church was held binding on them.
The Brady court acknowledged that the local church's posi-
tion was emotionally persuasive. 3 Legally, however, the court felt
obligated to enforce the U.M.C.'s decision to dispossess the Avery
congregation. Justice Haden, delivering the court's opinion, rea-
soned that "When one joins a church and contributes of his time
and property to the improvement of the church, he does so with
the recognition that, as a condition of membership, he submits
himself to the doctrine and rule of the church."' Regardless of any
actual understanding of such a condition, consent is implied from
the fact of membership alone. Therefore, the court cannot interfere
with intra-church questions decided in accordance with church
law. Although the implied-consent-to-be governed doctrine is con-
sistent with legal theory on implied contracts, there is an obvious
inequity involved. This view, in effect, permits one of the parties
in a civil suit to decide the disputed issue.5
In such a case, however, the task facing the court is more
complex than a mere balancing of equities. The final decision of
the court must be compatible with a tradition of separation of
church and state in addition to the dual constitutional guarantees
d.
11d. at 844.
sCasad, Church Property Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 44 (1970).
[Vol. 76
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of freedom of religion and non-establishment of religion by the
state. In order to accomplish this objective, the court must sepa-
rate questions of religious belief and practice that are within the
exclusive province of the church from those questions which fall
within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. A dispute over title to
property is a legal matter that civil courts are competent to resolve.
However, when a religious society is involved in such a suit, the
civil courts face the dilemma of how to settle the property question
equitably without interfering with religious doctrine.
Since most church affairs revolve around matters of doctrine,
it is difficult for the civil courts to avoid interference. 7 To do so,
the Brady court used a strictly organizational approach, adopting
a policy of enforcing the conclusions of those bodies or groups
within the established church structure that have the authority to
make property determinations. The U.M.C., for instance, is organ-
ized into a series of conferences or representative assemblies. Each
conference has jurisdiction over all the activities of the local
churches in a given area.
For example, the West Virginia Conference has jurisdiction
within the State of West Virginia with the exception of Berkley,
Jefferson, and Morgan Counties. The conferences, in turn, are ulti-
mately responsible to the General Conference, the highest church
authority. Thus, from an organizational standpoint, the decisions
of the General Conference and the West Virginia Annual Confer-
ence are conclusive with regard to the use and ownership of Avery
Chapel's property. Accordingly, in Brady, the West Virginia court
enforced the decision of these governing bodies. The court's non-
intervention policy leaves all questions of equity, as well as those
of religious doctrine, to the discretion of the organized church.
The court's approach marks a departure, in part, from prior
West Virginia case law. Two earlier cases, Woodrum v. Burton'
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'Church doctrine includes the form of church polity or government, the eccle-
siastical law regarding property, and the discipline, customs, and usages of a
church, written or unwritten. 198 S.E.2d. at 815.
8The Brady court did rely on a very early West Virginia case for support.
Venable v. Coffman, 2 W. Va. 310 (1867), involved an attempt by trustees and
members of a local congregation at Lewisburg to separate the local church and its
property from the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States. The local
congregation wanted to join a group of churches that had earlier separated from the
general church to form the Methodist Episcopal Church South. The deed to the
pioperty, however, contained language limiting the holding of the property "for the
3
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and Canterbury v. Canterbury,0 held that a showing of a "vital
and substantial departure from fundamental beliefs"" was neces-
sary in order for the court to enjoin one faction of the church from
the use of church property. Brady overruled both of these cases to
the extent that they permitted the civil court to make determina-
tions regarding church doctrine. Woodrum and Canterbury re-
flected the influence of English case law. Their approach, which
Brady rejected, was quite similar to Lord Eldon's Rule, the "im-
plied trust-departure from doctrine" rule." Under this rule, the
law impressed property contributed to a church with a trust in
favor of the fundamental doctrines and usages of the church at the
time of the contribution. In the event of a dispute over property
within the church, the courts were to award the property to the
faction remaining faithful to the original trust. This rule forced the
courts to become entangled in abstruse theological questions. Even
so, this was acceptable in England where the policy of state in-
volvement in religious matters was institutionalized by the Church
of England's relationship with the state.
Although Lord Eldon's doctrine came to the United States as
part of the English common law, it was flatly rejected by the
United States Supreme Court. In 1871, Watson v. Jones3 held that
a review of religious doctrine by a civil court interfered with the
religious freedom of all church members. Furthermore, such a de-
termination was deemed incompatible with the tradition of sepa-
ration of church and state that is fundamental to the American
system.
Watson involved a property dispute much like the one in
Brady. In protest over the general church's anti-slavery stand, a
use of ministers and members of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United
States of America ...." On this basis the court decided that the property be-
longed to the original church organization, rather than the local congregation:
They have power to join whatever church they please, however it
may be in disregard of the rules and constitution of the church to which
they may have formerly belonged, but they cannot by so doing affect the
rights of others, nor divert the use of property held in trust for a particular
and specified purpose, to another and different purpose, or use.
Id. at 324. This decision was later followed by Kreglo v. Fulk, 3 W. Va. 74 (1868).
'88 W. Va. 322, 107 S.E. 102 (1921).
1143 W. Va. 165, 100 S.E.2d. 565 (1957).
"Id. at 180, 100 S.E.2d. at 574.
'1Attorney-General v. Pearson, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817); Craigdallie v.
Aikman, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813).
380 U.S. (13 Wail.) 679 (1871).
[Vol, 76
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faction of the congregation of the Walnut Street Presbyterian
Church of Louisville renounced the authority of the Presbyterian
Church. Those members who remained loyal to the general church
brought legal action to remove the dissenters from the local church
premises. Viewing the anti-slavery stand of the general church as
a breach of church doctrine, the Kentucky court held in favor of
the dissenters.'" On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the State
court's attempt to substitute its own interpretation of church law
for that of the proper tribunal within the church hierarchy.'-
The majority opinion in Brady classified intra-church prop-
erty disputes into three categories. The first of these includes situa-
tions in which the church organization is hierarchial, as in the
Presbyterian and United Methodist churches. In such cases, the
local church is subordinate to the general church and subject to its
laws, procedures and government. The second category involves
churches with congregational polities in which the local church
congregation is wholly autonomous and independent. The final
category includes cases in which the deed, will, or other granting
instrument contains an express trust that conditions or limits con-
trol of the property in some manner.' 6
In accordance with a general policy of non-interference in reli-
gious matters, the Watson court held that in a case falling within
the first two categories the civil court should enforce the decision
of the ultimate authority within the church organization.' 7 Thus,
in a hierarchical church, the court would enforce the conclusion of
the highest decision-making body of that church, while in a
congregational-type church the majority of the congregation or a
designated local body would constitute the ultimate authority. In
the event of an express trust, on the other hand, the court should
not enforce a determination of the church's highest authority if
inconsistent with the uses or dispositions expressly outlined in the
"Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush. 363 (Ky. 1868).
'"The language in Watson is very similar to that in Brady:
[Whenever questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicato-
ries to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept
such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to
the case before them.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
"The 1949 deed in the Brady case provides an example of an express trust
situation. The pertinent sections of this deed are set out in note 1 supra.
'180 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 725, 727.
5
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granting instrument. Instead, the court should enforce the trust
according to the terms expressly set forth in the instrument. 8
The opinion in Watson was a landmark in the area of intra-
church disputes. 9 It was, however, modified by a later Supreme
Court decision, Gonzalez v. Archbishop of Manila.20 Whereas
Watson held that church adjudications of intra-church disputes
were conclusive, Gonzalez provided for limited review of such deci-
sions in instances of "fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness."', In all
other respects Gonzalez confirmed the position taken by Watson.
Although both Gonzalez and Watson were closely tied to the
issue of religious liberty, neither case was framed in constitutional
terms.2 Not until its 1952 decision in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral did the Supreme Court evoke a constitutional justifica-
tion for its earlier decisions.13 Kedroff considered a New York stat-
"Id. at 723.
"Watson set the tone for other federal decisions dealing with intra-church
disputes: Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367 (1970);
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (consti-
tutional argument); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gonzalez v.
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (modified common law rule).
11280 U.S. 1 (1929).
"Id. at 16.
22However, the Watson Court based its reasoning on the right of individuals to
free religious belief:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief,
to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine
which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does
not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual
members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But
it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could
appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of essence to
these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the
decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only
to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
-344 U.S. 94 (1952). Two earlier cases laid the groundwork for Kedroff. Everson
[Vol. 76
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ute which provided for the separation of the American branch of
the Russian Orthodox Church and its properties from the control
of the church hierarchy in Russia. The Court ruled that such inter-
vention in ecclesiastical affairs by the state was a violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments.? This decision elevated the non-
intervention principle of Watson to the status of a constitutional
limitation.2
Later Supreme Court cases have acknowledged alternatives to
the Watson rule. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God " suggests two possibilities. One alternative is for the state
legislature to design a special statute governing the ownership of
church property "that precludes state interference."27 In order for
such a statute to avoid state interference, it must provide for reso-
lution of property disputes without inquiry into doctrine and with-
out the establishment by the court of one form of church govern-
ment over another. These are essentially the constitutional limita-
tions within which a court must operate. This alternative, how-
ever, has the advantage of providing a guide for attorneys who are
writing a deed or will for the conveyance of property to a church.
Following the statutory guide, the attorney may be able to word
the conveyance to avoid litigation and carry out the donor's intent.
Another alternative is the application of "neutral principles of
law" by the court.? This approach was originally presented in
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church9 but
"v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 396 (1940).
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court made the free exercise of religion
and establishment clauses of the first amendment applicable to the states under
the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.211d. at 119.
nKreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960), involved basically the
same fact situation as Kedroff. In Kreshik, the Supreme Court placed the same
limitations on the judiciary as Kedroff did on the legislature. Such a limitation,
however, did not necessarily prohibit all state interference in the doctrine and
affairs of the church. Kreshik presents a good example of this point. Although the
Court used the Watson approach, it was still forced to determine whether the
highest judiciary in Russia or that of the American branch of the Russian Orthodox
Church was the ultimate judiciary. In awarding the church property to the group
recognized by the Russian hierarchy, the court actually resolved a doctrinal issue.
When a schism occurs at the highest levels of church government, as in Kreshik,
the Watson rule is not as effective in attaining its non-intervention objective.
2G396 U.S. 367 (1970).
2'1d. at 370.
21d.
-393 U.S. 440 (1969).
7
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was never explained. The Church of God case clarified the mean-
ing of "neutral principles," at least in dicta. Justice Brennan sug-
gested that the "formal title" doctrine was as constitutional as the
rule in Watson. Under this alternate doctrine the "civil court can
determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and gen-
eral state corporation laws."3" This language suggests that "neutral
principles of law" may refer to a given state's property law. If so,
the possibility of the application of principles such as laches, ad-
verse possession, and estoppel to church property cases arises. In
some factual situations, application of these principles and general
property law may bring more equitable results. On the other hand,
these neutral principles are not sensitive to religious needs and
beliefs. Therefore, results in cases applying these principles may
be no more equitable than those under the Watson rule. Moreover,
Watson has stood the test of time. Numerous decisions have found
its rule constitutionally acceptable, but the Supreme Court has not
specifically ruled on the two alternatives.3'
In essence, Brady v. Reiner is a reiteration of the older and
constitutionally tested Watson rule. It differs in only two respects
from the federal decision. One apparent difference is that Brady
acknowledges the right of civil courts to review church decisions.
This review power, as originally presented in Gonzalez v. Arch-
bishop of Manila, was limited to review of church decisions
reached through "fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness."32 While no
further explanation of this limitation was made in Gonzalez, the
language in Brady was more explicit. The court specifically stated
that all church decisions will be enforced "so long as the church
"0396 U.S. at 370.
3'The Church of God case involved a statute vesting control of property of all
churches, regardless of polity, in the trustees elected by voting members of the local
congregation. The Supreme Court dismissed this case for want of a substantial
federal question, since the dispute involved no inquiry into religious beliefs and
customs. Thus, the Court did not specifically rule on the constitutionality of this
type of statue. In Kedroff, the Court ruled the pertinent statute unconstitutional.
This, presumably, was because it was not drawn carefully enough. 344 U.S. at 119.
Certiorari was denied in the appeal of the Georgia court's second decision in Presby-
terian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). The
Georgia court again affirmed a decision for the local church, but this time the sole
basis for their decision was legal title. A denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted
as either agreement or disagreement with the legal title approach. For a further
discussion of the second Hull case and the Church of God case, see Casad, supra
note 5, at 66.
31280 U.S. at 16.
[Vol. 76
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involved follows its own rules."' ' In effect, the language in Brady
seems to limit the power of judicial review to those extreme cases
in which a church completely disregards its laws.
Another, more significant, difference between Watson and
Brady is that the latter involved a special statute that regulated
church ownership of property23 The West Virginia Constitution
provides that churches shall not be incorporated and that the legis-
lature must enact statutes to provide a method by which these
unincorporated societies may secure title to property.35 The legisla-
ture passed a statute in accordance with the constitutional provi-
sion,31 specifying a method by which churches may hold property
through appointed trustees. In respect to disputed property claims,
this method incorporates the law as stated in Watson.3 Although
the statute vests control of church property in the local parish,
congregation, or branch of the church to which it was conveyed, 3
3198 S.E.2d. at 844.
3 This statutory approach was suggested in the Presbyterian Church and
Church of God cases. For a further discussion of this approach, see the text accom-
panying notes 26 and 27 supra.
3W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 47 provides:
No charter of incorporation shall be granted to any church or reli-
gious denomination. Provisions may be made by general laws for securing
the title to church property, and for the sale and transfer thereof, so that
it shall be held, used, or transferred for the purposes of such church, or
religious denomination.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1 to 13 (1966).
"Id. § 12 provides:
When any individual church, parish, congregation, or local branch
of any religious sect, society, or denomination, has become extinct, or has
dissolved, or has ceased to occupy and use its property for its religious
and charitable purposes, or its property may be regarded as abandoned,
a suit in chancery may be instituted in the county where the property of
such individual church, parish, congregation, or local branch is situated
... and the court shall hear the matter and make such disposition of the
property, or proceeds thereof, as is allowable under the terms of the
conveyance, dedication, devise, gift or bequest of such property, and will
be in accordance with the laws of such church, religious sect, society or
denomination. The printed acts or laws of such church, religious sect,
society or denomination, issued by its authority, embodied in book or
pamphlet form, shall be taken and regarded as the law and acts of such
church, religious sect, society or denomination.
2'Id. § 1 provides that a conveyance of property to a church:
shall be construed to give the local parish, congregation or branch of such
church, religious sect, society or denomination, to which any such land
or property has been or shall be so conveyed, devised or dedicated, the
control thereof, unless from the intent expressed in the conveyance,
9
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this control is apparently not equivalent to ownership." The ulti-
mate control, as in Watson, is left with "authorities which, under
the rules or usages of such church. . . have charge of the adminis-
tration of the temporalities thereof."' 0 Moreover, the statute looks
to the law of the church for the methods of appointment and re-
moval of trustees,4 ' even providing for an exception in the case of
an express trust in the deed."
Using the text in Hull, the Brady court found the above stat-
ute to be "a neutral and acceptable vehicle for the application of
church ecclesiastical law to property disputes involving churches
.. . .- This view is not surprising, given the similarity between
the method of resolving property disputes outlined in the statute
and that outlined in Watson. The only noticeable variation be-
tween the statute and the Watson rule is the establishment of an
objective method of determining what constitutes church law. The
West Virginia statute defines church law as the "printed acts or
laws of such church. . . issued by its authority, embodied in book
or pamphlet form .... "'i Church law, as so defined, may be
admitted as evidence in a property dispute. By designating the
authoritative church law in this way, the West Virginia statute
clarifies the limits of church discretion.
These statutory provisions and the West Virginia constitu-
tional provision for religious freedom and non-establishment pro-
vide a solid foundation of State law for Brady v. Reiner. In particu-
lar, the Brady court acknowledged this section of the constitution
as influential. 5 The court considered the West Virginia provision
grant, will, gift or dedication, some other or larger body be given such
control.
"'Carskadon v. Torreyson, 17 W. Va. 43 (1880).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-4 (1966).
"The West Virginia statute covering church property ownership provides for
the removal and replacement of trustees by the body within the church which
appointed them originally. Id. §§ 5, 7.
Id. §§ 1, 4, 12.
'1198 S.E.2d. at 839.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1966).
"SW. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15 provides:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wor-
ship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor shall any man be enforced, re-
strained, molested or burthened in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer,
on account of his religious opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to
profess, and by argument, to maintain in their opinions in matters of
religion; and the same shall, in no wise, affect, diminish or enlarge their
civil capacities; and the legislature shall not prescribe any religious test
[Vol. 76
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for religious freedom and non-establishment to be even stricter
than the corresponding provision in the Federal Constitution."
This view may at least partially explain the stringent limitation
on judicial review in Brady. It certainly gives the Brady non-
intervention holding a strong foundation both in State and federal
law.
Even so, there are some questions left unanswered by Brady.
Perhaps the most obvious is the absence of a provision for cases in
which the polity or organization of the church is undetermined.
The Watson rule is designed to be applied to churches whose or-
ganization is clearly either hierarchical or congregational. In
churches with hybrid polities, there is no method of deciding which
body within the church has ultimate authority. For example, the
organization of the United Lutheran Church exhibits elements of
both the hierarchical and congregational organizations and cannot
be clearly identified as either." While Brady is clear as to the limits
of judicial power in such situations, it goes no further. It simply
states that the civil courts can "identify the polity and locus of
authority of a church body only where such are known and settled
by ecclesiastical law or discipline." 8 The court's position of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of the church offers the only clue
as to how West Virginia courts may handle such situations. Given
this policy, it seems reasonable to assume that, if there is no clear
answer to the problem in the written church law, the court will
simply enforce the deed according to its terms. This approach
would be similar to the "neutral principles of law" approach set
forth in Hull.
The West Virginia courts may also encounter practical and
whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any sect or
denomination, or pass any law requiring or authorizing any religious so-
ciety, or the people of any district within this State, to levy on them-
selves, or others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house for public
worship, or for the support of any church or ministry, but it shall be left
free for every person to select his religious instructor, and to make for his
support, such private contract as he shall please.
"'The Brady court refied on State v. Everly, 150 W. Va. 423, 146 S.E.2d. 705
(1966), in reaching this conclusion.
"Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1962). The same problem might arise in a situation where
churches with different polities have merged. An example of this would be the 1957
merger of the Congregational Christian and Evangelical and Reformed Churches
to form the United Church of Christ. Casad, The Establishment Clause and the
Ecumenical Movement, 62 MicH. L. REv. 419, 431 (1964).
11198 S.E.2d. at 815.
11
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theoretical problems in cases involving democratically governed
churches. The controlling majority in a congregational-type church
is likely to be a rapidly fluctuating and easily manipulated group.
There is also little chance that the lay members of the congregation
will have a thorough knowledge of church law. For these reasons,
the court may have difficulty in determining which faction within
the congregation holds a majority position. Once it has accom-
plished this task, the court may have an even more difficult prob-
lem. Under the Watson rule, the majority decision of the members
of a congregational church controls, regardless of the religious is-
sues involved. Therefore, the majority can retain control of church
property even if it changes the denominational stand of the church
or decides to merge with another church of an entirely different
denomination. 9
In such cases, the "consent-to-be-governed doctrine" and the
non-establishment argument used to justify the Brady rule are
substantially weakened. An assumption that an individual con-
sents to a complete denominational change when he becomes a
member of a church is unreasonable. More importantly, when a
member donates his time and money to a church, it is reasonable
to assume that he does so in reliance on at least a minimum degree
of denominational stability. Logically, then, it does not follow that
"implied-consent-to-be-governed" is consent to allow the congre-
gational majority to change entirely the denominational stand of
the church. Such an assumption would stretch the consent implied
by membership in a church to unrealistic proportions."
There is also some question as to whether a strict application
of Brady under such circumstances violates the first amendment's
establishment clause. If a majority of church members change the
denomination or organization of their religious group, they, in ef-
fect, form another church. The dissenting minority, on the other
hand, retains its former organization and beliefs. Therefore, it can
be argued that when the court awards church property to that
majority, it aids in the establishment of one church or form of
church to the detriment of another. 5' No federal cases have ruled
"Casad, supra note 5, at 44.
-Id.
"The dissent in Brady was based on similar reasoning. Justice Carrigan found
the majority decision in violation of W. VA. CONST. art. Il, § 15:
The Avery Chapel is in the position of being told by the national
body of the United Methodist Church-believe as we say you should
believe, or we will take all of your property. Thus, the local congregations
[Vol. 76
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on this point. In fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court have all
dealt with hierarchically organized churches.2 Two West Virginia
cases, Woodrum v. Burton"3 and Canterbury v. Canterbury," did
deal with the congregationally organized Baptist Church. Al-
though the rulings in these cases were found partially unconstitu-
tional in Brady, they shed some light on the issue. Woodrum dis-
tinguished the two different types of church polities. The dicta in
this case implied that the rule used should be tailored to the type
of church government. It suggested that law similar to that in
Watson and Brady applies in the case of a hierarchical church. In
a congregational polity, the court held that a different approach,
including consideration of both majority opinion and church doc-
trine, would be used.-5
The constitutionality of such an approach is highly suspect,
but it does suggest that the court recognized the essential differ-
ences between the two types of church polities. It also suggests that
the Watson rule may need to be modified when applied to indepen-
dent congregational churches. One possible modification would be
to qualify majority control in cases of denominational or organiza-
tional change by the majority. Under this qualification, the minor-
ity group remaining loyal to the original organization could retain
the property. This solution, of course, is objectionable to the extent
that it entails interference in religious doctrine. At most, it would
be applicable only in cases of total denominational or, more specif-
ically, organizational change. This alteration would be basically
are forced to subscribe to beliefs and doctrines which may not coincide
with theirs, under penalty of forfeiting all they have accumulated for
their church over a period of years.
198 S.E.2d at 845 (dissenting opinion).
52Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1954); Gonzalez v. Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S.
1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
188 W. Va. 322, 107 S.E. 102 (1921).
11143 W. Va. 165, 100 S.E.2d. 565 (1957).
588 W. Va. at 333, 107 S.E. at 106. Woodrum clearly indicated that in churches
where there are organs with jurisdiction over the determination of internal disagree-
ments, the civil courts will not interfere "except when the solution is grossly unjust
or the decision fraudulently is obtained." This stand sounds distinctly like the
Watson approach. Woodrum, however, took a different position with respect to a
congregational church organization. In this type of organization, there is no judicial
body except the congregation. Thus, the court would enforce the majority decision
in regard to property with a single exception in the case of a substantial departure
from fundamental doctrine.
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consistent with the language in Brady v. Reiner, since Brady per-
mits judicial review in instances where the determinations of the
church are not consistent with church law.
Despite the problems involved, the decision in Brady is defini-
tive. It clearly complies with constitutional limitations and is suffi-
ciently precise to eliminate the need for litigation under most cir-
cumstances." The only way for a donor of property to a church to
insure avoidance of an outcome like that in Brady is through the
use of an express trust in the granting instrument. In this manner
the property will pass according to the deed rather than the rule
of the church. A donor conveying property to the trustees of the
Avery Methodist Church, for example, could specify that the prop-
erty be held for a specific use or for the benefit of a particular body
or group within the church. One of the deeds considered in Brady
involved an express trust of this sort. The trust conditioned prop-
erty ownership on the disciplinary use of the General Conference
and the West Virginia Annual Conference. Consistently with the
Watson holding, Brady ruled that this parcel of property would
pass according to the terms provided in the deed.5 7 Although there
was no evidence of an express trust of personal property in Brady,
the West Virginia court further stated that the same rule should
apply for such gifts." This method of avoiding church control is not
foolproof, however. Care must be taken to word the trust to remove
any need for interpretation of doctrinal issues by the court. A
conveyance for the teaching and spread of a particular doctrine,
therefore, would be unenforceable, since a civil court does not have
jurisdiction to determine which group actually teaches the stated
belief.
In this respect, as in all others, Brady stands for noninterfer-
ence by the civil courts in matters of church doctrine. There is,
however, another unarticulated principle behind Brady and its
federal counterparts. This principle is that the law is primarily
concerned with protecting the stability of religious institutions re-
gardless of what equities or alterations in doctrine or usage may
be involved.-9 Institutionalized religion, as well as religious free-
56The Brady court concluded that "the thrust of this decision almost com-
pletely closes the doors of civil courts in this State to those who would complain of
a church-adjudicated ruling to their detriment. We intend it to be thus." 198
S.E.2d. at 844.
57Id. at 822. The pertinent provisions of this deed are set forth in note 2 supra.
5Id. at 843.
"Casad, supra note 5, at 67.
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dom, is apparently protected by the Constitution. Although the
Brady court made no determinations regarding religious doctrine,
its decision exemplifies this lack of neutrality. The court favored
the organized church in that it left the authority over all internal
church disputes to the church's discretion. This type of support for
established religious institutions is deeply entrenched in federal
case law. In some cases, it may result in apparent inequities. The
virtue of favoring the religious status quo, however, is that such
treatment leads to a workable resolution of disputes.
Linda S. Thompson
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